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Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient infor-
mation exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between players
are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks.
Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors — they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors —
but they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity,
they also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and in-
vasion of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations,
on the other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of
information exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks
reveal that there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only
when a small number of facilitators occupies the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing
cooperative hubs are more than compensated by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information
exchange is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it
is not always optimal for the main hubs to become “leaders of the masses”, but rather to exploit their highly
connected state to promote tit-for-tat-like behavior.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Unraveling the mechanisms at the origin of cooperation and
understanding the reasons for so much biological diversity
are among the most important challenges to Darwin’s natural
selection theory. For instance, it has been found that tropi-
cal forests and coral reefs teem with biological variation, and
there are also many examples of insects that coordinate their
efforts and even give up their own reproductive potential (fit-
ness) to benefit that of the “queen” [1]. Other examples in-
clude micro-organisms that can join forces to form biofilms
and humans who are able to be “supercooperators” [2, 3].
If only the fittest individuals survive and reproduce [4], why
is there so much diversity in nature [5]? What are the mecha-
nisms that originate and maintain cooperative behavior? Evo-
lutionary game theory (EGT) addresses these questions by
means of simple but insightful models in which each individ-
ual’s fitness varies and depends on the others’ reproductive
potential [6–8]. EGT is the natural framework to mathemat-
ically study the dynamics of competing strategies (species),
and the above fundamental questions have motivated a large
body of work. In the context of EGT, understanding the evolu-
tion of cooperation often leads to a “social dilemma”, such as
in the paradigmatic prisoner’s dilemma game [9], where each
rational individual chooses to defect (i.e. not to cooperate)
while it would be in everyone’s interest to cooperate. Coop-
eration dilemmas also arise in other EGT models such as the
snowdrift and stag-hunt games [10, 11].
Among the mechanisms that have been put forward to
possibly explain the spread of cooperation, the influence of
kin and group selection, as well as various forms of reci-
procity (direct, indirect and network reciprocity), have been
investigated, see e.g. Refs. [12–17]. In particular, network
reciprocity [11, 18–20], whose principle has an appealing
physical interpretation (cooperators are better off when they
are surrounded by cooperators), has recently attracted in-
terest in the physics community [21–33]. Quite interest-
ingly it has been found that, in contrast to what happens
in spatially-homogeneous (well-mixed) populations, the ar-
rangement of individuals according to certain topologies can
lead to very different scenarios. For instance, it was found
that local interactions on regular lattices enhance the survival
of cooperators in prisoner’s dilemma games but inhibit their
resistance against the invasion by “defectors” in snowdrift
games [14, 16].
Recently, the promotion of cooperation in the presence of
cooperation facilitators has been investigated [34–36]. These
are special individuals who interact with competing players
by mirroring their strategies, but they do not participate in
the strategy exchange process. More precisely, they cooper-
ate with cooperators and defect with defectors, but their status
never changes over time, as they never adopt the strategy of
another player. The influence of cooperation facilitators has
been studied for the prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag-
hunt games in spatially-homogeneous populations. In such
a setting, the mean field analysis and the cooperation fixa-
tion probability reveal that the invasion and replacement of
defection by cooperation is favored when the number of fa-
cilitators exceeds a nontrivial critical value. When players
are distributed on a structured population, however, we may
face additional, competing effects. This is not only because
each player has a limited interaction neighborhood, but also
because facilitators, who do not participate in the strategy ex-
change process, can hinder the spread of information and so
decelerate or even stop the invasion of the more successful
strategy.
2To clarify the impact of these effects, we consider evolu-
tionary games where competing strategies and facilitators are
interpreted as species of a spatially-structured population. The
fundamental question we aim to address is how the enhanced
reciprocity on the one hand and the limited information ex-
change on the other hand interplay due to the presence of
facilitators. To this end, we investigate the influence of fa-
cilitators (here, individuals facilitating either cooperators or
defectors, see below) on a class of two-strategy games when
individuals interact with their neighbors on a network. We
specifically consider the cases of two-dimensional lattices and
degree-homogeneous random graphs, as well as (heteroge-
neous) scale-free networks.
The organization of this paper is as follows: the models
of social dilemmas with facilitators are introduced in the next
section, and the main properties of the non-spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game with facilitators are outlined in Section III.
Numerical results for the level of cooperation in evolution-
ary games with facilitators on structured populations are pre-
sented and discussed in Sections IV and V.
II. SOCIAL DILEMMAS WITH FACILITATORS
We study pairwise evolutionary games on the square lat-
tice, the random regular (degree-homogeneous)graph, and the
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [37], each with an aver-
age degree k = 4 and size N . Mutual cooperation yields
the reward R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and
the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S
and the defector the temptation T . Within this setup we have
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game if T > R > P > S, the
snowdrift game (SG) if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt
(SH) game if R > T > P > S, thus covering all three ma-
jor social dilemma types. Without loss of generality, and for
the sake of clarity, we set R = 1, P = 0, 0 ≤ T ≤ 2, and
−1 ≤ S ≤ 1, as illustrated in Fig. 1. We note that T < 1
and S > 0 quadrant marks the harmony game (HG), which
however does not constitute a social dilemma. To further re-
duce the dimensionality of the parameter space, we introduce
T = 1+r and S = −r, where−1 ≤ r ≤ 1 constitutes a diag-
onal across the T − S plane that splits the harmony game and
the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant in half. Note that for r < 0
we are in the harmony game quadrant, while for r > 0 we are
in the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant. This parametrization of
the prisoner’s dilemma game is the most challenging for the
evolution of cooperation, and it is sometimes referred to as the
donation game [38].
Initially, in addition to the cooperators (C) and defectors
(D) who are distributed uniformly at random in equal pro-
portion, we designate a fraction ρF of players as facilitators
(F ). Facilitators behave like mirrors to their neighbors, true
to the most elementary form of reciprocity. A facilitator will
cooperate with a cooperator, and it will defect with a defector.
However, facilitators do not accumulate payoffs, and they do
not participate in the exchange of strategies [47]. This means
that facilitators can not be overtaken by other players, and they
also can not spread. Accordingly, the fraction ρF remains con-
stant throughout the evolutionary process, and their positions
on the network do not change. Within this setup, we seek to
determine the optimal fraction of facilitators, as well as their
impact on each particular social dilemma type.
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with
the standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. Among the subset of coop-
erators and defectors on the network, a randomly selected
player x acquires its payoffPx by playing the game with all its
neighbors. Next, player x randomly chooses one (also a non-
facilitator) neighbor y, who then also acquires its payoff Py in
the same way as previously player x. Lastly, player x adopts
the strategy sy from player y with a probability determined by
the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process [11]. Note that K can be interpreted
as being proportional to the selection intensity, see e.g. [7].
In agreement with previous works, the selected value ensures
that better-performing players are readily followed by their
neighbors, although adopting the strategy of a player that per-
forms worse is not impossible either [45, 46]. This accounts
for imperfect information, errors in the evaluation of the op-
ponent, and similar unpredictable factors. We note however,
that qualitatively identical behavior can be observed for other
finite values of K where the stochastic imitation dynamics re-
mains non-neutral. Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives
a chance for every player to change its strategy once on av-
erage. All simulation results are obtained on networks with
N = 104− 2 · 105 players or more (including the facilitators)
depending on the proximity to phase transition points, and the
fraction of cooperators ρC is determined in the stationary state
after a sufficiently long relaxation (up to 2 ·105 MCS). To fur-
ther improve accuracy, the final results are averaged over up to
100 independent runs where interaction networks were gener-
ated 50 times for random and scale-free graphs at each set of
parameter values.
III. NON-SPATIAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA WITH
FACILITATORS
To better appreciate the influence of topology on social
dilemmas in the presence of facilitators, it is useful to out-
line the properties of the prisoner’s dilemma with facilitators
in the mean field setting and on a complete graph [34, 35]. In
this section, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma whose payoff
matrix has entries T for temptation (with 1 < T ≤ 2), R = 1
for mutual defection, P = 0 for punishment and S (with
−1 ≤ S < 0) as Sucker’s payoff, and assume T + S ≥ 1.
In the mean field and complete graph settings, the pop-
ulation structure is homogeneous (“well-mixed”) and space
therefore does not matter: any individual can interact with
all the others. In a homogeneous population of size N , con-
sisting of j = NρC cooperators, k = NρD defectors and
ℓ = NρF facilitators, the expected payoff of a cooperator
3is therefore ΠCj =
j+ℓ−1
N−1 + S
k
N−1 and for a defector is
ΠDj = T
j
N−1 (self-interactions have been omitted). It is use-
ful to introduce the payoff difference of competing strategies
∆Πj = Π
D
j −Π
C
j , as it is then easy to see that the difference
consists of two terms ∆Πj = α(j/N) + β, where the first
cooperator dependent term contains α =
(
N
N−1
)
(T +S− 1)
while the fixed second term β = 1−S(N−ℓ)−ℓN−1 depends only
on the fraction of facilitators.
A. The mean field limit
The mean field limit (MF) limit corresponds to a spatially-
homogeneous population of infinite size, N → ∞. In this
situation, the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma with facili-
tators is described by a replicator-like equation for the density
ρC = j/N of cooperators [7, 10, 39–42]. Here, since the
underlying dynamics is implemented with the Fermi rule (1),
such an equation reads [34, 35]
dρC
dt
= −ρC(1− ρC − ρF ) tanh
(
αρC + β
2K
)
, (2)
where in the MF limit, α = T + S − 1 ≥ 0 and β = (S −
1)ρF − S. The analysis of (2) readily reveals three distinct
behaviors depending on the fraction of facilitators ρF :
(i) When ρF ≤ S/(S − 1) ≡ ρ˜F , defection is still the
dominant strategy and the population evolves towards
ρC = 0 and ρD = 1− ρF (only attractor).
(ii) On the other hand, when ρ˜F < ρF < 1 − T−1
and T + S > 1 the only attractor of (2) is
ρ∗C = −β/α =
S+(1−S)ρF
T+S−1 . There is a stable
coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
(iii) When ρF > 1 − T−1 and T + S > 1, cooperation
is the dominant strategy and the dynamics approaches
ρC = 1− ρF and ρD = 0.
It is worth noting that Eq. (2) has no coexistence steady state
when T +S = 1 (since α = 0). The MF dynamics along such
a special line reproduces the behaviors (i) and (iii): ρC =
1 − ρF is stable when ρF > ρ˜F (since β > 0) and unstable
otherwise, with ρC = 0 being the only attractor when ρF <
ρ˜F .
B. The case of complete graphs (N <∞)
When the population is well-mixed and of finite size, N <
∞, its evolution is usually described in terms of a birth-and-
death Markov chain with absorbing boundaries [7, 34, 35, 42].
In this case, the fixation of either defection (ρC = 0) or co-
operation (ρC = 1 − ρF ) is guaranteed. On complete graphs,
the dynamics is implemented as a Markov chain with rates
T±j =
j(N−ℓ−j)
N(N−1)
[
1 + e±(αj+Nβ)/NK
]−1 for the transitions
j → j ± 1.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation with and without
facilitators on the square lattice. Depicted is the rescaled station-
ary fraction of cooperators ρC on the whole T − S parameter plane,
as obtained in the absence of facilitators (red dotted lines) and with
ρF = 0.05 (green solid lines). It can be observed that facilitators do
not change the qualitative properties of the solutions, but their pres-
ence does shift the survival barrier of cooperators towards harsher
conditions, especially in the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant, see text.
Since fluctuations prevent stable coexistence when N <
∞, it is important to understand when cooperation is fa-
vored by selection. The following conditions have been pro-
posed [7, 43]: (1) the invasion by cooperators is favored when
∆Π1 < 0; (2) selection favors the replacement of defec-
tion by cooperation when (N − ℓ)φC > 1, where φC =[
1 +
∑N−ℓ−1
n=1 exp
(
n
2NK [α(n + 1) + 2Nβ]
)]−1
is the fixa-
tion probability of a single cooperator [35].
When N ≫ ℓ, the invasion condition (1) is satisfied when
ρF > ρ˜F , while the replacement condition (2) reads
N − ℓ >
N−ℓ∑
n=1
exp
[
αn
K
(
n
2N
+
β
α
)]
(3)
and is satisfied when ρF > ρ∗F , where ρ∗F is a critical value
obtained by equating both sides of (3). It has been found that
ρ∗F ≥ ρ˜F when T + S > 1 and ρ∗F ≤ ρ˜F otherwise (with
ρ∗F = ρ˜F when T + S = 1) [35].
In summary, in the MF limit cooperators and defectors co-
exist when the fraction of facilitator ρF exceeds the critical
value ρ˜F = S/(S − 1) and T + S ≥ 1, whereas coopera-
tion is favored on complete graphs when ρF is above a critical
value ρ∗F ≥ ρ˜F .
IV. RESULTS ON NETWORKS
We begin by studying the impact of facilitators on the
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The re-
sults are summarized in Fig. 1. For a comprehensive insight,
we compare the outcomes of the evolutionary process on the
whole T − S parameter plane, as obtained with and without
facilitators. To allow for a better comparison of the influence
4of facilitators, in Fig 1 and in the other figures, we report
the relative density of cooperators obtained by rescaling the
physical fraction of cooperators present in the population by
(1 − ρF )
−1
, i.e. we have rescaled ρC → ρC/(1 − ρF ) so
that in all the figures its value always ranges between 0 and
1. The presented results indicate that the impact of facilitators
can be considered as a second-order effect. While the results
do not change qualitatively, the survival threshold of coop-
erators shifts considerably towards harsher conditions. This
is most pronounced in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) quadrant,
although quantitative changes are observable in the snowdrift
(SD) and the stag-hunt (SH) quadrant as well. Facilitators ex-
ercise a second-order effect because the outcome is primarily
determined by the fact that the evolutionary games are staged
on a structured population (in this case the square lattice).
The spatiality of interactions always allows cooperators and
defectors to coexist in a special parameter interval while the
presence of facilitators shifts the borders of different stable
solutions. This behavior is significantly different form the
non-spatial behavior of evolutionary games with facilitators
outlined in the previous section, where their presence can rad-
ically change the character of solutions and the type of the
social dilemma. In Fig. 1 we also notice that nothing unchar-
acteristic happens along the line T + S = 1. Henceforth, we
will characterize the comprehensive properties of the evolu-
tionary games on networks by conveniently focusing on the
parametrization T = 1 + r, S = −r, with −1 ≤ r ≤ 1.
This parametrization constitutes a diagonal across the pris-
oner’s dilemma and harmony game quadrant.
Next, we explore how the topology of the interaction net-
work affects the impact of facilitators. To avoid effects stem-
ming from the heterogeneity of the interaction network, we
first compare the outcomes obtained on the square lattice and
the random regular (degree-homogeneous) graph. On both
these networks every player has four neighbors (k = 4).
As Fig. 2 shows, the principal impact of facilitators is to
widen the parameter range where C and D players coexist.
Moreover, increasing ρF increases the fraction of cooperators
within this interval, and as expected, contribute to a higher
level of cooperation in the population. However, if the frac-
tion of facilitators becomes too high, typically ρF > 0.4, then
facilitators will no longer play solely the role of mirrors to
their neighbors, but they will also serve as “walls” that pre-
vent efficient information spreading throughout the system.
At this point, it is worth reiterating that facilitators do not par-
ticipate actively in the evolutionary process. Consequently,
too many facilitators will separate competing strategies, and
there will be segregation with the population splitting apart
into smaller fragments. Within these small and effectively
isolated regions, the parametrization of the game, and thus
the type of the social dilemma, no longer plays a decisive role
for the survival of the two competing strategies. Effectively, a
“dilemma hiding” effect sets in, where the prevailing config-
uration is determined the local initial conditions and remains
frozen afterwards. This means that, after a very short initial
period, the strategies can no longer evolve according to the
dynamics that would be dictated by the payoff elements. The
ultimate consequence of the “dilemma hiding” effect is that,
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FIG. 2: The impact of facilitators on the square lattice (top) and the
random regular graph (bottom). Depicted is the stationary fraction
of cooperators ρC in dependence on r, as obtained for different frac-
tions of facilitators occupying the network (see figure legend for the
values of ρF ). Due to the qualitatively identical results obtained on
the two networks, it can be concluded that the topology of the in-
teraction network does not play a notable role. More precisely, if
the network remains degree-homogeneous, then the randomness of
interactions yields the same results as lattice-type models.
within the locally frozen states, some cooperators may sur-
vive even at the most demanding conditions that constitute a
prisoner’s dilemma (r = 1), and vice versa, some defectors
may survive even at the most lenient conditions that charac-
terize the harmony game (r = −1). Two representative snap-
shots depicting such an evolutionary outcome are presented in
Fig. 3.
It is also worth comparing the results obtained on random
graphs with degree k = 4 and the predictions obtained for
complete graphs where the degree is equal to N : on the lat-
ter, at a fixed value of ρF , we have shown that cooperation
prevails when r < ρF /(1 − ρF ). On the other hand, if the
node degree is four then ρC ≈ 1 when r ≤ 0 while ρC ≈ 0
when r >∼ 3ρF . The comparison of critical facilitator den-
sity with the results of numerical simulations for the random
regular graphs with k = 4 in Fig. 4 reveals that the critical
threshold on the latter is always below the mean field predic-
tion ρ˜F . This indicates that less facilitators are needed on a
random regular graph with a finite degree than on a complete
5FIG. 3: (Color online) Characteristic distributions of cooperators
(blue, dark grey) and defectors (red, light grey) on the L × L =
100 × 100 square lattice, as obtained for r = −1 (left) and r = 1
(right) if the fraction of facilitators (gray) is sufficiently high for them
to split the population in effectively isolated smaller fragments. The
left panel depicts the outcome of the most lenient harmony game, yet
still some defectors are able to survive. On the contrary, the right
panel depicts the outcome of the harshest prisoner’s dilemma game,
yet cooperators survive. In both panels the fraction of facilitators is
ρF = 0.5.
graph for cooperation to prevail.
So far, we have considered only homogeneous interaction
networks, where the distribution of facilitators was always
uniformly random, and the specific placement did not matter
because all players on the square lattice and the random regu-
lar graph have the same degree. This changes if instead we ap-
ply heterogeneous interaction graphs, like the scale-free net-
works, where the distribution of degree is a power law. We use
the algorithm proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [37] to con-
struct scale-free networks with the average degree k = 4 and
degree distribution Pk ∼ k−3 (BA graphs), and we consider
four different cases of where on the network to place facilita-
tors. First, to keep the analogy with the previous treatment on
homogeneous networks, we choose players uniformly at ran-
dom regardless of their degree. As results presented in Fig. 5
(top) illustrate, increasing ρF will not just increase ρC , but it
will also expand gradually the coexistence region significantly
toward stronger social dilemmas (higher values of r).
Naturally, we could also observe the “dilemma hiding” ef-
fect for sufficiently high values of ρF (now shown), which for
the considered scale-free network and randomly distributed
facilitators begins at ρF ≈ 0.5. If, on the other hand, facil-
itators are placed on low or intermediate degree nodes, the
“dilemma hiding” effect appears only at even larger values
of ρF . This is understandable since low degree nodes have
a lower number of links to the other players, and hence dis-
abling their ability to transfer information obviously has a
lesser impact than if one of the network hubs would loose
this ability. In terms of the impact of facilitators on the evo-
lution of cooperation, however, placing facilitators on low or
intermediate degree nodes has qualitatively the same impact
as placing them randomly across the whole network. As evi-
denced by the results presented in Fig. 5 (middle and bottom),
the only difference is that the shift of the border where both
strategies can coexist is obviously smaller if facilitators oc-
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FIG. 4: The minimal fraction of facilitators that is necessary to avoid
the tragedy of the commons (the pure D state) as a function of r =
T−1 for the prisoner’s dilemma: Cooperation becomes viable above
this threshold. Comparison of the mean field prediction ρ˜F = r/(1+
r) (dotted line) with the value obtained by numerical simulations on
random graphs with regular degree 4 (symbols). When the degree
increases, the symbols would move towards the mean field line (not
shown here). See also main text for details.
cupy low degree nodes, and it is slightly larger if facilitators
occupy intermediate degree nodes. The shift is the largest if
the placement of facilitators is uniformly random regardless
of the degree of players, presumably because some facilita-
tors then also occupy the hubs of the network.
Studying the impact of facilitators targeted on high degree
nodes will resolve this ambiguity, but before presenting the re-
sults, it is worth emphasizing that the expectations are rather
conflicting for this particular case. On the one hand, we may
hope that placing the facilitators on the hubs will improve the
cooperation level even further because their special status can
enhance network reciprocity (this hope is also justified by the
preceding results presented in Fig. 5). On the other hand, it is
precisely this special position of facilitators that brings this ex-
pectation into questioning. As demonstrated in several previ-
ous works [11, 21, 44], hubs of scale-free networks play a cru-
cial role in ensuring highly cooperative states under adverse
conditions. Only the cooperative hubs can reap long-term
benefits from their highly connected status, and thus serve as
a lucid reminder of the benefits of cooperative behavior. How-
ever, if we place facilitators on the hubs, then this mechanism
can no longer work. Effectively, we remove the cooperative
leaders and replace them with “mirrors” instead. We empha-
size again that here facilitators cannot be “followed”, i.e., they
just exactly reciprocate the strategy of each of their neighbors.
Consequently, the level of cooperation may drop back to the
level we observe on homogeneous networks. Another draw-
back of placing facilitators on the hubs is the hindering of the
information flow through the system, which in this case is par-
ticularly effective and can thus easily evoke the “dilemma hid-
ing” effect demonstrated in Fig. 3.
All these arguments make the results presented in Fig. 6,
which were obtained by placing facilitators on the high de-
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FIG. 5: The impact of facilitators on the scale-free network if their
placement is uniformly random regardless of the degree of players
(top), or if their placement is limited to players with low (middle) or
intermediate (bottom) degree. Depicted is the stationary fraction of
cooperators ρC in dependence on r, as obtained for different frac-
tions of facilitators occupying the network (see figure legend for the
values of ρF ). As in Fig. 2, increasing the value of ρF will signifi-
cantly extend the region where cooperators and defectors are able to
coexist, especially if the facilitators are placed randomly (top). The
results are obtained using N = 105 system size, see text.
gree nodes of the BA scale-free network, especially interest-
ing. These results partly fulfill our expectations outlined in the
previous paragraph, but there are also some unexpected out-
comes. More precisely, the “dilemma hiding” effect emerges
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FIG. 6: The impact of facilitators on the BA scale-free network if
their placement is limited to players with high degree. Depicted is
the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on r, as ob-
tained for different fractions of facilitators occupying the targeted
high degree nodes (see figure legend for the values of ρF placed at
the most connected nodes). These results reveal the existence of the
optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity (see
main text for details). Compared to the results presented in Fig. 5,
only in this particular case is it possible to combine the two effects to
arrive at the best conditions for widespread cooperation. The results
are obtained using N = 105 system size.
at rather small ρF values. If the top 5% of nodes are occupied
by facilitators, for instance, then we can observe cooperators
surviving even at the highest r value, but some defectors pre-
vail in the harmony game region (r < 0) as well, thus indi-
cating an imperfect information flow. This effect is even more
evident at higher densities of facilitators. However, if only
the top 1% of nodes host facilitators, then the information
exchange remains practically flawless, but at the same time
a significant improvement in cooperation level due to active
reciprocity can be observed too. Here the region of near com-
plete cooperation dominance is extended toward significantly
higher r values (shifted from rc ≈ −0.15 to rc ≈ +0.2),
which is surprising because players cannot imitate the main
hubs. Still, some prominently-placed facilitators (mirrors) are
able not just to compensate the impaired learning process, but
even promote cooperation more efficiently then a flawlessly
learning process would do. Naturally, in this case too the
spreading of cooperative behavior happens predominantly via
learning, but not through the most obvious channels — via
the strongest hubs — but rather via the slightly less dominant
nodes of the scale-free networks. More precisely, indirect
connections between less preferred players around the hubs
still work, which enables the spreading of the most success-
ful strategy. At the same time, the advantages of cooperation
are massively amplified by facilitators, which introduce direct
reciprocity that pays more than undisturbed learning. We note
that the results presented here for BA graphs are expected to
hold for scale-free networks of degree-distribution Pk ∼ k−γ
with 1 < γ ≤ 3 that are characterized by high-degree nodes,
while we expect to recover the random degree-homogeneous
scenario when γ > 3 (”hubs” are then unlikely).
7V. DISCUSSION
We have studied the role of facilitators on structured pop-
ulations. Facilitators are the ideal mirror to their neighbors,
and as such they introduce reciprocity directly to the studied
evolutionary games. Results obtained for well-mixed popu-
lations show that facilitators favor the evolution of cooper-
ation as long as they are sufficiently present in the popula-
tion. Importantly, there are no negative consequences even if
their numbers become large. On structured populations this
no longer holds, because in addition to reciprocity, facilitators
also obstruct information exchange. Here, facilitators coop-
erate with cooperators and defect with defectors, but they do
not participate in the exchange of strategies, meaning that they
can not be overtaken by other players, and they also can not
spread. Accordingly, we have shown that if the facilitators
are too many, they no longer play solely the role of mirrors
to their neighbors, but they also act as “walls” that prevent
efficient information spreading throughout the system. These
walls separate competing strategies, and they compartmental-
ize the population into effectively isolated regions. Within
these regions the type of the social dilemma no longer plays
a decisive role for the survival of the two competing strate-
gies, and effectively a “dilemma hiding” effect sets in. Only if
the fraction of facilitators is sufficiently small is the evolution
of cooperation promoted, in particular by extending the sur-
vival region of cooperators towards harsher conditions. Be-
sides homogeneous networks such as the square lattice and
the random regular graph, we have also considered heteroge-
neous interaction networks — the most representative being
the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network — where the place-
ment of facilitators plays a decisive role. If the facilitators
occupied the main hubs of the network, we were able to ob-
serve the optimal interplay between the benefits of reciprocity
and the drawbacks of hindered information exchange. This
result is highly counterintuitive because previous research has
strongly emphasized the crucial role of cooperative hubs for
the successful evolution of cooperation [11, 21, 44]. Ac-
cording to established previous reasoning, hubs are able in-
fluence their large neighborhoods directly, which yields large
homogeneous domains and thus facilitates the manifestation
of long-term benefits of cooperation. Here we have found that
hubs can work even better in favor of cooperative behavior if
they are not used as “leaders of the masses”, but rather as mir-
rors to their many neighbors. As an avenue to explore in the
future, it could be interesting to study how the results on het-
erogeneous graphs might change if we apply different degree
distributions of nodes. If we decrease the number of hubs,
for example, then the results may tend towards those we have
obtained on regular graphs where there are no distinguished
players.
Summarizing, we have shown that reciprocity outperforms
imitation via learning, and that the latter can still be effectively
enough re-routed through the auxiliary hubs. This delicate
balance between augmented reciprocity and information ex-
change proves to be the best combination that is able to main-
tain cooperation even at the most adverse conditions, while
at the same time disallowing widespread defection at lenient
conditions. Interestingly, it could be better to promote tit-for-
tat-like behavior in prominent players rather than for them to
aspire towards leader-follower relations.
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